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1 Introduction
In this paper we focus on two aspects of micro-finance that have, perhaps,
received less attention in the theoretical literature than they deserve. The
first involves the linkage between micro-finance and borrower (women) em-
powerment. The second involves the role of savings in micro-finance. In
particular we examine a lending scheme where the provision of credit is
conditional on prior savings, and examine the impact of such a scheme on
the allocation of loans between strongly and weakly empowered borrowers.
Many of the micro-finance programs are built around women. In fact, for
many people, “micro-finance is all about banking for women” (Aghion and
Morduch, 2005).1 In this context, there are two issues of critical interest.
While the literature is largely concerned with whether micro-finance helps in
empowerment of women (Aghion and Morduch, 2005, chapter7), a related
and perhaps logically prior question is the issue of loan allocation: In a
heterogenous population consisting of both the strongly and the weakly
empowered borrowers, who obtain these micro-finance loans, the strong or
the weak? In this paper we make a beginning in analyzing this issue.
In recent years there has been a growing debate as to the role of savings
in micro-finance. This is part of a larger debate as to which offers a better
way out of poverty, savings or borrowing. We take the view, as do Aghion
and Morduch (2005), that “the two (approaches) are complementary.” We
thus examine a two-stage micro-finance program with joint liability, where
the provision of credit is tied to prior savings by the borrowers.
While many micro-finance organizations, including Grameen, have a
compulsory savings scheme, these savings are locked in until the loan is re-
1Mody (2000) found that women make up 80% of the clients of the 34 largest micro-
lenders. Yunus (2001) found that 95% of the clientele of the Grameen Bank comprises
women. For various reasons, e.g. selection of safer investments, lesser mobility, greater
amenability to peer pressure, etc., women have a better repayment rate in case of micro-
finance loans (Aghion and Morduch, 2005).
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paid, so that they primarily act as guarantee for the loans taken. In contrast
we consider a scheme where the savings are not locked in, but invested in
the project itself. This scheme, therefore, provides a direct channel through
which savings can be converted into assets,2 and provides a conceptual mid-
dle ground between compulsory and voluntary savings. In particular, we
are interested in the effect of the prior savings requirement on the group-
formation process, as well as the allocation of loans.
An analysis of such a two-stage scheme is motivated by the self help
group (SHG) linkage program in India.3 Under this program borrowers
endogenously form into SHGs, with initially the members saving regularly
for a certain period of time. This process is usually facilitated by some
NGO. Once a group manages to meet its savings target, it is linked to some
bank,4 which lends it a further sum, usually up to four times the amount
saved, on a joint liability basis.
Our analysis suggests that the prior savings requirement serves two pur-
poses. First, as long as the borrowers are not too similar with respect to
their level of empowerment, an increase in the prior savings requirement in-
creases the incentive for homogenous group-formation. Second, the savings
requirement can be used as a screening tool to weed out weak borrowers.
The analysis also sheds some light on the relative efficacy of group-lending
vis-a-vis individual lending. We find that, for intermediate values of the
rate of interest, group-lending is feasible, while individual lending is not.
2It is possible of course to consider a scheme which have elements of both, in the sense
that a part is locked in, and the rest is not. The fact that compulsory savings can act as
collateral is, however, well understood, and for focus we mostly abstract from this aspect.
3In fact, the SHG linkage program is rapidly turning into the dominant micro-finance
paradigm in India (Basu and Srivastava, 2005). The number of self help groups linked to
banks has increased from 500 in the early 1990s, to over 8,00,000 by 2004. Between 1999
and 2003, the amount of loans disbursed through this program increased by 3487%. Even
under this scheme, women constitute the bulk of the borrowers.
4Rural branches of state owned commercial banks, regional rural banks, cooperative
banks, etc.
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Whereas if the rate of interest is relatively high, then individual lending
may dominate group-lending.
The first conceptual challenge is to formalize the notion of an empow-
ered borrower. In doing so, we move away from the traditional unitary
approach to modeling household decisions pioneered by Becker (see, e.g.
Becker, 1993), and follow the more recent approach that explicitly allows
for conflicts among various members.5 Moreover, we take a purely economic
view of empowerment and interpret it as the ability to control household
income. While, as pointed out by Basu (2006) and others, empowerment is
a multi-dimensional concept, in this paper for the most part we will not be
concerned with these.6
We assume that there are two classes of (women) borrowers, strong (S
type) and weak (W type). Compared to weak borrowers, strong borrowers
have a greater chance of being empowered, i.e. being in control of household
finances. Our formulation is consistent with Goetz and Sengupta (1996)
who argue that only 60% of the women in their survey on micro-finance had
partial or full control of their investment activities, whereas the rest had no
control at all. Further, in case a borrower is not in control, the household
income is allocated in a manner that yields no utility to the borrower. This
is consistent with the evidence that the same flow of income going to a
household can have very different impact depending on the whether the
man, or the woman is the recipient.7
5See, among others, Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994).
6For example, we completely abstract from the issue of violence, as well as the choice
of activities under micro-finance (whether traditional or not), two of the key concerns in
the literature. Further, unlike in Basu (2006), we shall take the level of empowerment to
be exogenously given. This issue is considered in somewhat greater details in section 6.
7Ten dollars given to the male head and the same amount given to his wife can have very
different implications not only for the amount of tobacco and alcohol purchased, but also
on child labor, education and health (Kanbur and Haddad, 1995). In the micro-finance
context, similar results were obtained by Khandker (2003).
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We consider a two period dynamic model with moral hazard and en-
dogenous group-formation. There are many borrowers. In any given period,
the S-types have a greater chance of being empowered. All borrowers have
access to a project that requires an initial setup cost. The borrowers initial
income is less than the setup cost, so that starting a project requires outside
funding from a bank. The bank decides on a saving requirement for the
borrowers, and lends the difference (between the setup cost and the amount
saved) to some selected borrower or SHG. The project returns depend on
whether the borrowers work, or shirk. The moral hazard problem arises
since the effort levels are non-verifiable.
Even under individual lending we find that there are several screening
mechanisms at play. First, some W-type borrowers, i.e. those who are not
empowered in period 1, will be screened out.8 Second, by manipulating
the savings requirement, s, appropriately, the W-types can be screened out.
This is possible since for any given s the expected payoff is higher for the
S-types.
We then consider joint liability lending (JLL). There is endogenous group
formation whereby the borrowers who manage to save, form SHGs of size
two among themselves. The key issue here is whether there will be SS-type
group formation or not. In case the bank decides to lend, it randomly selects
one of the SHGs and lends it the balance amount required to start a project.
The members of the selected SHG then endogenously decide on how much
effort to put into the projects.
We find that under joint liability lending there is SS-type group forma-
tion. The intuition is simple. Because of joint liability, having an S type
partner is preferable to having an W type partner. This contribution, how-
ever, is more valuable to an S-type borrower since she is more likely to be
empowered herself. Hence an S-type has a greater incentive to match up
8While some S-types will also be screened out, the screening mechanism is stronger for
the W-types.
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with an S-type. Interestingly, the incentive to form SS-type groups may be
non-monotonic in the savings requirement, s. It is increasing in the sav-
ings requirement as long as the two types are not too similar. Otherwise,
however, the incentive to form SS-type groups may be decreasing in s.9 Fur-
ther, under some realistic assumptions the level of s chosen by the bank is
sub-optimal.
We then compare group-lending with individual lending. Interestingly,
for intermediate values of the rate of interest, individual lending is not
feasible, while group-lending is. This result provides a raison d’etre for
group-lending in this context. For relatively high rates of interest, however,
individual lending may dominate group-lending.
Interestingly, both these results hinge on a negative aspect of joint lia-
bility lending, something that we call the contagion effect. Because of joint
liability, the incentive to work is lower under group-lending. In case one
borrower shirks, the other one has no incentive to work since she will be in-
curring the disutility from working without getting any monetary benefits.
Hence, ceteris paribus, the payoff of any borrower is higher under individ-
ual lending, compared to that under group-lending. Thus, for intermediate
values of the rate of interest, it is possible to screen out weak types (i.e.
WW-type groups) under group lending, but not under individual lending.
This improves the pool of borrowers under joint liability lending, hence the
result.
If the rate of interest is relatively large however, then weak types will be
screened out under both institutional forms. There are two effects at play
here. Because of the contagion effect, the bank is likely to prefer individual
lending. On the other hand, screening out requires a higher savings pre-
requisite, which may make the bank prefer group-lending. In case the weak
9Of course, the idea that JLL may affect the nature of group-formation is not new.
Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Tassel (1999) demonstrate that joint liability lending leads to
positive assortative matching so that borrowers of the same type club together.
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types are extremely dis-empowered however, the first effect dominates so
that the bank prefers individual lending over group-lending.
Finally, we argue that our framework can be used to analyze some of
rich social complexities associated with the group-lending process, e.g. the
endogenous determination of the level of empowerment.
We then relate our paper to the literature. Aniket (2007) is another
paper that considers a micro-finance model with savings. His paper is not
concerned with the issue of borrower empowerment though. In a model
with intra-group competition for loans, he finds that there could be nega-
tive assortative matching in terms of wealth levels. He then examines the
implications of his model with respect to borrower outreach. Clearly, apart
from the commonality in terms of the focus on savings, the two papers are
very different as regards the issues addressed, the modeling and the results.
There is of course a vast and growing literature dealing with various aspects
of group-lending. Relatively recent surveys of this literature include Aghion
and Morduch (2005), Ghatak and Guinanne (1999) and Morduch (1999).
The next section describes the economic environment. In section 3, we
analyze the outcome under individual lending, whereas joint liability lending
is taken up in section 4. Section 5 compares and contrasts individual lend-
ing with joint liability lending. Section 6 discusses some robustness issues.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The Economic Environment
We consider a dynamic two period game with one bank and a continuum of
borrowers. Each borrower has access to one identical project. The oppor-
tunity cost of capital is normalized to zero, thus all agents have a discount
factor of 1.
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2.1 The Borrowers
The borrowers are risk neutral, have no assets and there is limited liability.
At the start of period 1, every borrower household has an income of s < 1.
The borrowers are of two types, strong (S type) and weak (W type). Let λji
denote the probability that a type j borrower, j ∈ {W,S}, is in charge of
allocating household income in period i, i ∈ {1, 2}. We assume that λS1 =
λS2 = λS and λ
W
1 = λ
W
2 = λW , where 0 < λW < λS ≤ 1. Thus, in any given
period, a strong (respectively weak) borrower controls household income,
i.e. is empowered, with probability λS (respectively λW ). For simplicity we
assume that half the borrowers are strong, and half are weak.
In period i, a borrower who is in charge of household income will be
denoted an E(i)-borrower, where E is an obvious mnemonic for empowered.
2.2 The Bank
There is a single risk neutral bank, that can observe the actual project
returns. Under individual lending the bank lends, if at all, to two individual
borrowers, whereas under group-lending it lends, if at all, to one SHG.10 Let
(1− s) (respectively 2(1− s)) denote the amount the bank is willing to lend
to any one individual (respectively SHG) in period 1, where 1 − s ≤ 1 − s.
The amount s, where s ∈ [0, 1], is a policy variable for the bank. Lending is
contingent on the savings requirement being met. The bank maximizes its
profit subject to a break-even constraint.
For every dollar loaned, the amount to be repaid is r (≥ 1), where r is
exogenously given.11 Such rigidities in the rate of interest arise naturally if it
10This assumption is a simplifying one, and allows us to abstract from the issue that
by reducing (1− s), the bank can serve a greater number of villagers. Since this trade-off,
while undoubtedly important, is not our focus in this paper, we have chosen to abstract
from it.
11We follow Besley and Coate (1995) in assuming that the rate of interest is exogenous.
However, some authors e.g. Ghatak (1999, 2000), Tassel (1999) etc. do take the rate of
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is exogenously fixed by the government, perhaps on political grounds. In the
context of the SHG-linkage program in India, for example, this assumption is
not too implausible given that the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural
Development (NABARD), a governmental organization, plays a leading role
in the program.12
2.3 Individual and Joint Liability Lending
We examine two alternative forms of lending, individual and joint liability.
Consider period 1. Under individual lending the bank randomly selects
one of the E(1)-borrowers who have managed to save s, and makes her an
advance of (1−s). Whereas under joint liability lending, the E(1)-borrowers
endogenously form self-help groups of size two, with each member saving s.
The bank randomly selects one of these groups, and makes it an advance
of 2(1 − s). Thus the group has a total fund of 2, which is divided equally
among the two borrowers.13 Further, there is joint liability in the sense that
if one of the borrowers have a payoff of X whereas the other one has zero,
then the first borrower will have to repay on behalf of both of them (to the
extent possible).
2.4 The Projects
Every borrower has access to a project that requires a startup capital of 1.
Any borrower that wants to start a project can borrow at most 1− s from
the bank (provided the bank is willing to lend to her), and has to save the
rest, i.e. s. Project returns are verifiable and depends on the effort level
interest to be endogenous.
12In a case-study of an SHG-linkage program in Haryana, India, Aniket (2006) finds
that the rate of interest is often set by government lending agencies, e.g. the Rastriya
Mahila Kosh and National Minorities Development Finance Corporation.
13The sequence of actions under individual (respectively joint liability) lending will be
described in greater details in section 3 (respectively section 4).
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put in by the borrower. For all projects, the return equals X in case the
borrower works, and equals zero in case the borrower shirks. In case the
borrower works, the monetized value of the disutility from working equals e,
where X > e > 0.14 There is no such disutility in case the borrower shirks,
of course.
For simplicity we assume that the project return X is neither too large,
nor too small.
Assumption 1. 2r(1− s) > X > X − e > r.
We shall later find that, A1 implies that for an empowered borrower it
is optimal to work rather than to shirk under individual lending. Similarly,
under group-lending, A1 implies that in case one of the borrowers work,
then it is optimal for the other borrower to work as well if she is empowered,
whereas in case one of the borrowers shirk, then it is optimal for the other
borrower to shirk as well.
2.5 Allocation of Household Income
In period 1, an E(1)-borrower can allocate the household income, s, among
savings, or expenditure for productive purposes. This savings will be in-
vested in her project in case she receives a further loan, of (1− s), from the
bank. Otherwise, this too will be spent for productive purposes.
Next consider period 2. If she had invested in her project earlier, and is
E(2), then she spends the income from the project, if any, productively.
In either period, if the borrower is not in charge, the household income
is spent unproductively, and the borrower derives no utility from it. A bor-
rower derives utility from expenditure if and only if it is used for productive
14We have examined a variation of this model where the effort levels vary continuously
and the effort cost function is convex. We find that our results are qualitatively robust to
this alternative formulation.
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purposes.15
3 Individual Lending
Individual lending is of interest in itself, specially since many micro-finance
organizations, in particular the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), are using
individual lending schemes. Further, the analysis for this case provides a
benchmark for group-lending.
3.1 The Sequence of Actions
In period 1, the bank chooses some s ≤ s, and lends (1−s) to some borrower
who is randomly selected among those who manage to save s. In period 2,
the selected borrower chooses her effort level. A more formal description
follows:
Period 1.
Stage 1. The bank selects some s, where 0 ≤ s ≤ s. Further, the
borrowers get to know whether they are in charge in this period or
not. All borrowers who are in charge save s, and spend the remaining
(s− s) productively.
Stage 2. In case the bank decides to offer the loans, it then randomly
selects two of the borrowers who have managed to save s, and lends
them another (1 − s) each. The selected borrowers invest the sum of
the amount saved and borrowed, i.e. 1, in their own projects. The
borrowers who are not selected, spend the amount saved in stage 1,
i.e. s, productively.
Period 2.
15The utility functions will be formally specified later on.
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Stage 1. The borrowers get to know whether they are in control of
household income in this period or not.
Stage 2. The selected borrowers, if any, decides on their effort levels.16
In case the borrowers work, the payoff of both in period two alone (net
of effort costs) is X − (1− s)r − e, and the bank gets back 2(1− s)r.
Otherwise, the bank does not obtain anything and the borrowers have
a period two payoff of zero.
3.2 The Analysis
For ease of exposition let us denote
Z(s) = X − (1− s)r − e. (1)
We then solve this game through backwards induction.
Period 2. Stage 2. Consider a borrower who has invested in her
project. If she is E(2), then, given that X − e > r > (1− s)r (Assumption
1), her period two payoff from working, i.e. X − (1− s)r − e, exceeds that
from shirking, which is 0. Thus, it is optimal to work. If she is not in charge,
then working is sub-optimal since she incurs the effort cost e without getting
any monetary returns.
Let vi(r) denote the payoff, aggregated over the two periods, of a type
i borrower who obtains the bank loan, given that the decision to work or
shirk is taken optimally. Thus,
vS(s) = λSZ(s) + s− s, (2)
and, vW (s) = λWZ(s) + s− s. (3)
We need some notations.
16We have examined a variation of the model where the borrowers make their effort
choices before getting to know whether they are in control in this period or not. We find
that this does not affect the results qualitatively.
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Definition. si =
 s′i, if s′i, solving vi(s) = s, is well defined,1, otherwise,
where note that
s′i =
λi(X − r − e)
1− λir . (4)
Clearly, si is such that if s′i is well defined, then at s = si, in period 1
an E(1)-borrower of type i has the same payoff from obtaining a loan and
not obtaining one (when she has a payoff of s).
Given that vi(0) = λi(X − r − e) + s > s and vi(s) is monotonic in s,
it is clear that s′i is well defined whenever vi(s) < s. Observation 1 below
summarizes a few properties of si. It follows from the fact that λS > λW
(see Figure 1).
Observation 1. (i) sS > sW , whenever sW < 1. Further, sS = 1.
(ii) ∀i ∈ {W,S}, vi(s) ≥ s, i.e. taking a loan is individually rational for
a borrower, if and only if s ≤ si.
(iii) If sS > s ≥ sW , then the S-type alone will find it individually
rational to take a loan.
Observation 1(iii) is central to the analysis in this section and shows that
for intermediate values of s, the W-types may be completely screened out of
the market.17 It is interesting that, in contrast to most of the literature, in
our framework W types can be screened out by using only one instrument,
i.e. s.18 Clearly such screening improves the pool of potential borrowers, so
that the bank is more likely to break even.
We then assume that r is neither too large, nor too small. While this
17We adopt the tie-breaking rule that in case the payoff from taking a loan equals that
from not taking one, a borrower prefers not to take a loan. This is for ease of exposition
alone.
18In Ghatak (2000), for example, screening requires two instruments, the rate of interest
and the extent of joint liability.
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assumption is not critical for the analysis, it simplifies the exposition.
Assumption 2. (i) λ2Sr − 1 > 0.
(ii) r(λ2S + λ
2
W )− (λS + λW ) < 0.
Assumption 2(i) implies that if W-type borrowers can be screened out,
then individual and group lending are both feasible. Whereas A2(ii) ensures
that in case the W-types cannot be screened out, then neither individual,
nor group-lending is feasible.
Period 1. Stage 2. Consider the bank’s payoff. There are two cases.
(i) In case sW ≤ s < sS , only the S type borrowers will find it optimal
to take a loan, and the bank’s net payoff is
B′(s) = 2(1− s)(λSr − 1). (5)
(ii) If s < sW , then all borrowers will find it optimal to take a loan.
Since λW2 (respectively
λS
2 ) of the weak (respectively strong) borrowers can
save s, the bank’s net payoff in this case is
B′′(s) = 2(1− s)[rλ
2
S + λ
2
W
λS + λW
− 1]. (6)
Observe that B′(s) > B′′(s), which reflects the fact that the bank faces
a safer pool of borrowers in case (i) as the weak types are screened out.
Period 1. Stage 1. We then solve for the optimal s set by the bank.
Suppose sW = 1. Then for any s ≤ s, s < 1 = sW , so that the W-types
cannot be screened out (Observation 1(ii)), and the bank’s payoff is B′′(s).
Given A2(ii), lending is not feasible and the bank sets some s > s so that
it can avoid lending. Whereas if sW ≤ s, then the W-types can be screened
out (Observation 1(ii)), so that the bank’s payoff is B′(s). From (5) and
A2(i), B′(s) is positive for all s ≤ s. Moreover, from (5) the bank’s payoff is
decreasing in s, so that it sets s at the lowest possible level that allows for
screening out of W-types. Hence optimally the bank sets s = sW .
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Formally, we have
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Individual lending
is feasible if and only if W-type borrowers can be screened out, i.e. vW (s) =
λW (X +(1− s)r− e) ≤ s. In case individual lending is feasible, the optimal
s set by the bank equals sW .
The analysis in this section shows that even under individual lending,
there are two kinds of screening mechanisms at play. First, since loans are
only given to borrowers who have managed to save in period 1, W types will
be screened out unless they are empowered. Of course, some S-types are
also screened out, but to a lesser extent compared to the W-types. Further,
under certain parameter conditions, all W types can be screened out of the
market through an appropriate choice of s.
4 Joint Liability Lending
We then turn to the main focus of this paper, group-lending with joint
liability. We endogenously solve for the group-formation process, and also
examine the impact of a change in the savings pre-requisite, s, on group-
formation. Further, we characterize conditions for JLL to be feasible, and
solve for the optimal s in case JLL is feasible.
4.1 The Sequence of Actions
In period 1, the bank chooses some s ≤ s, and lends 2(1− s) to some SHG
that is randomly selected among those that manage to save 2s. In period 2,
members of the selected SHG choose their effort level.
Period 1.
Stage 1. The bank selects some s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ s. Further, the
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borrowers get to know whether they are in charge in this period or
not.
Stage 2. The E(1) borrowers all save s, and spend (s−s) productively.
There is endogenous group formation whereby, the E(1) borrowers
organize themselves into groups of two. Depending on the type of
borrowers comprising the groups, these can be of three types, SS, WW
and SW. Of course, the borrowers have the option of not forming a
group at all. It is possible, for example, that all S type borrowers form
SS type groups, whereas the W type borrowers remain single.
Stage 3. The bank decides on whether to make a loan or not. In case
the bank decides to make a loan, it randomly selects one of the SHGs,
and lends the SHG another 2(1 − s). The selected SHG thus has a
total of 2 dollars, out of which each member obtains 1 dollar which
they invest in their respective projects. Members of other SHGs spend
their savings productively.
Period 2.
Stage 1. The borrowers get to know whether they are in charge in this
period or not.
Stage 2. The members of the selected SHG, say borrowers 1 and
2, simultaneously decide on how much effort to put into their own
projects. In case both the borrowers work, each borrower has a net
payoff of X − (1 − s)r − e in this period, and the bank is repaid
2(1− s)r. If both the borrowers shirk, then the bank does not obtain
anything and both the borrowers have a period two payoff of zero.
Whereas if borrower 1 (say) works and borrower 2 shirks, then, given
joint liability, the bank gets back X (since, from A1, X < 2(1− s)r),
borrower 1 has a period two payoff of −e and borrower 2 has a period
two payoff of zero.
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4.2 The Solution Concept
The solution concept is as follows:
• We first solve for the renegotiation-proof Nash equilibrium of the game
in period 2. Clearly the notion of renegotiation-proofness (as well
as the optimal sorting principle) allows for coordination among the
agents. In the context of lending to rural communities with close inter-
actions, allowing for such coordination may not be too unreasonable.19
• In stage 3 of period 1, the bank’s decision as to whether to make a
loan or not, is solved using backwards induction.
• The group-formation process in stage 2 of period 1 is solved using
the optimal sorting principle, which says that borrowers cannot form
a new group without making some member of the new group worse
off.20
• Finally, we use backwards induction to solve for the optimal s in stage
1 of period 1.
We need some further definitions.
Definition. There is positive assortative matching (henceforth PAM) if
group formation is homogenous, i.e. S types match up with S types, and
W types match up with W types.
Definition. There is negative assortative matching (henceforth NAM)
if group formation is heterogenous, i.e all groups are of type SW .
Definition. There is positive assortative matching of type ii, i ∈ {S,W},
(henceforth PAM-ii) if i types match-up with i-types, and j-types, j 6= i,
19In the present context, this is of course equivalent to solving for the set of Nash
equilibria and then using the Pareto criterion on this set.
20In this context the optimal sorting principle was first used by Ghatak (1999, 2000).
The formal definition follows shortly.
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remain single.
For ease of exposition we shall sometimes write “positive assortative
matching” (henceforth “PAM”) to denote PAM and PAM-SS.
Let vij denote the expected equilibrium payoff, aggregated over the two
periods, of a type i borrower at stage 3 of period 1, if she forms a group
with a type j borrower, i, j ∈ {S,W}, and the group receives the bank loan.
We shall later find that this subgame has a unique equilibrium so that vij
is well defined.
Optimal Sorting Principle. We shall later argue that
vSS > vSW = vWS > vWW . (7)
Given this, the optimal sorting principle, assuming that side payments are
possible, yields the following:
• Suppose that vWW > s, so that for any borrower of type i, group
formation (with any borrower of type j) dominates remaining single
(when she has a payoff of s). There will be PAM whenever
vSS − vSW > vWS − vWW . (8)
Otherwise, there will be NAM.
Equation (8) states that the maximum a type W borrower is willing
to pay to a type S borrower, is strictly less than the minimum a type
S borrower will need as compensation for having a type W partner.
• Suppose that vWW ≤ s < vSW , so that for any W type borrower
remaining single is preferable to forming a group with another W type
borrower. Then there will be PAM-SS whenever
vSS + s > vSW + vWS . (9)
Otherwise, there will be NAM.
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• Finally, suppose that vSW ≤ s < vSS . Then group-formation can only
involve PAM-SS.
4.3 The Analysis
We next turn to solving this game.
Stage 2. Period 2. We first solve for the equilibrium effort levels of the
two borrowers. Depending on how many of the borrowers are empowered in
period 2, there are two cases to consider.
Case (i). First consider the case where both the borrowers are empow-
ered. There are two possible Nash equilibria of this game. One involves both
the borrowers working, and the other involves both of them shirking. First,
consider the candidate Nash equilibrium where both work. Given that the
other borrower is working, the period 2 payoff of a borrower from working
herself is X−e−(1−s)r. From A1, X−e−(1−s)r > 0, so that it is optimal
to work rather than to shirk. Next consider the candidate Nash equilibrium
where both shirk. Given that the other borrower is shirking, A1, and the
fact that there is joint liability, the period two payoff of a borrower from
working herself is −e. Therefore, it is optimal to shirk rather than to work.
Under the Nash equilibrium where both work, the borrowers’ period 2
payoff equals X − e − (1 − s)r, whereas it equals zero in case both shirk.
From A1, X − e− (1− s)r > 0, so that the renegotiation-proof equilibrium
involves both of them working.
Case (ii). We then consider the case where at most one of the borrowers
is empowered. The borrower who is out of control will clearly shirk. Further,
given joint liability, and the fact that X − 2(1 − s)r < 0 (A1), the other
borrower will shirk irrespective of whether she is in control or not.
18
Given the above discussion we have the following expressions for vij :
vSS(s) = λ2SZ(s) + s− s, (10)
vWW (s) = λ2WZ(s) + s− s, (11)
and, vSW (s) = vWS(s) = λWλSZ(s) + s− s. (12)
From equations (10), (11) and (12), observe that vSS > vSW = vWS >
vWW , so that equation (7) earlier holds.
Definition. sij =
 s′ij , if s′ij , solving vij(s) = s, is well defined,1, otherwise,
where note that
s′ij =
λiλj(X − r − e)
1− λiλjr . (13)
Thus sij such that, whenever s′ij is well defined, at s = sij , an E(1)-
borrower of type i is indifferent between forming a group with a type j
borrower and obtaining a loan, and not obtaining one.
Note that s′ij is well defined whenever vij(s) < s. Observation 2 below
follows from equation (7) and the fact that vij(s) is monotonic in s (see
Figure 2).
Observation 2. (i) sSS > sSW = sWS > sWW , whenever sSW < 1.
Further, sSS = 1.
(ii) For all i, j ∈ {S,W}, vij(s) ≥ s, i.e. for a type i E(1)-borrower,
forming an SHG with a type j E(1)-borrower is individually rational if and
only if s ≤ sij.
(iii) If sSS > s ≥ sWW , then taking a loan is (strictly) individually
rational for an SS-type group, but not a WW-type group.
Observation 2(iii) shows that for intermediate values of s, WW-type
groups have no incentive to form.
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Stage 3. Period 1. The bank makes the loan if and only if its expected
payoff from making a loan is non-negative. We shall later argue that en-
dogenous group-formation will lead to “PAM”. We thus derive the expected
payoff of the bank in case there is PAM, or PAM-SS.
Case (i). Suppose that there is PAM-SS (implying that sWW ≤ s <
sSS). Then only the SS-type groups will obtain the loan, and the expected
payoff for the bank is
B(s) = 2(1− s)(λ2Sr − 1). (14)
Case (ii). Whereas if there is PAM (implying that s < sWW ), so that
both types of groups will be interested in the loan, the expected payoff for
the bank is
B(s) = 2(1− s)[rλ
3
S + λ
3
W
λS + λW
− 1]. (15)
Note that B(s) < B(s), reflecting the fact that the bank faces a safer
pool of borrowers in the first case.
Period 1. Stage 2. We then consider the endogenous group formation
phase. The results are summarized in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Endogenous group-
formation leads to PAM in case sWW > s, and PAM-SS if sSS > s ≥ sWW .
Proof. There are three cases to consider.
(i) First suppose sWW > s. From equations (10) - (12), there is PAM if
and only if vSS+vWW > vSW +vWS , i.e. (λS−λW )2Z > 0. This is satisfied
since, from A1, Z = X − (1− s)r − e > 0.
(ii) Next let sWW ≤ s < sSW . There is PAM-SS provided vSS + s >
vSW + vWS . This is satisfied since
vSS + s > vSS + vWW > vSW + vWS ,
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where the last inequality follows from A1.
(iii) Finally, let sSS > s ≥ sSW . In this case, the only feasible group-
formation involves PAM-SS.
The intuition is as follows. It is sufficient to consider the case where
sWW > s. Clearly, for any borrower, having an S type partner is preferable
to having an W type partner. This follows since, because of joint liability,
an S-type borrower inflicts a lower cost on her partner in case she is not in
control in the second period. Note, however, that this marginal contribution
is valuable if and only if the borrower is herself empowered. Since an S-type
borrower is more likely to be empowered herself, the marginal contribution
is relatively more valuable to her. Hence the maximum a type W borrower
is willing to pay to a type S borrower, is strictly less than the minimum a
type S borrower will need as compensation for having a type W partner.
Stage 1. Period 1. We then solve for the optimal s set by the bank.
To begin with, note that whenever sWW = 1, screening out WW types
groups is not possible (since s ≤ s < 1), so that the bank’s payoff is B(s).
From A2(ii) and (15), group-lending is not feasible and the bank sets s > s,
so as to avoid making a loan. Whereas if sWW ≤ s, then the WW-type
groups can be screened out, so that the payoff of the bank is B(s). From
(14) and A2(i), B(s) > 0 for all s ≤ s. Moreover, since the bank’s payoff is
decreasing in s, it optimally sets s at the smallest possible level that allows
for screening, i.e. sWW . Thus the bank has a payoff of B(sWW ) > 0.
We can now write down our next proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Joint liability
lending leads to “PAM”. Further, it is feasible if and only if WW-type groups
can be screened out, i.e. vWW (s) = λ2W [X − (1− s)r − e] ≤ s. In case joint
liability lending is feasible, the optimal s set by the bank equals sWW .
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Thus joint liability lending leads to “positive assortative matching” among
empowered borrowers. Further, for some parameter configurations, groups
consisting of weak borrowers can be screened out using an appropriate level
of s, viz. sWW .
4.4 Incentive for “Positive Assortative Matching”
As the preceding analysis shows, the nature of group-formation, in particular
the formation of SS-type groups, is critical to the success of JLL. In this
sub-section we therefore examine the effect of a change in the savings pre-
requisite, s, on the incentive for “PAM” vis-a-vis NAM.
Let I(s) denote the incentive for “PAM”. Clearly, I(s) is the difference
between the aggregate payoffs of one S-type and one W-type borrower under
two alternative scenarios, namely “PAM” and NAM.
We then turn to providing a formal definition of I(s). Clearly, if sWW >
s, then the choice is between PAM and NAM. Whereas if sSW > s ≥ sWW ,
then the choice is between PAM-SS and NAM. Finally, if sSS > s ≥ sSW
then the choice is between PAM-SS and not forming any group. Hence we
have the following
Definition. Let
I(s) =

vSS(s) + vWW (s)− vSW (s)− vWS(s), if sWW > s,
vSS(s) + s− vSW (s)− vWS(s), if sSW > s ≥ sWW ,
vSS − s, if sSS > s ≥ sSW .
It is easy to see that vSS(s) + vWW (s) − vSW (s) − vWS(s) = (λS −
λW )2Z(s), which is increasing in s. Next observe that vSS(s)+s−vSW (s)−
vWS(s) = (λ2S − 2λWλS)Z(s) + s. This is increasing in s if and only if
λS > 2λW .
Proposition 4 shows that the incentive for SS-type group formation may
be non-monotonic in s. It is increasing in s as long as the two types are
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not too similar in terms of their levels of empowerment. If, however, the
empowerment levels are sufficiently close, and s is at an intermediate level,
then an increase in s may reduce the incentive for “PAM”.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) Suppose s < sWW . Then I(s) is increasing in s.
(ii) Suppose sWS > s ≥ sWW . Then I(s) is decreasing in s if λS < 2λW ,
and increasing in s if λS > 2λW .
(iii) Suppose sSS > s ≥ sWS. Then I(s) is increasing in s.
Proof. (i) In this case forming all three types of groups, SS, WW and
SW, are individually rational.
(ii) In this case forming SS and SW type groups are individually rational,
but not WW type groups.
(iii) In this case only SS-type groups are individually rational.
Consider Proposition 4(i). With an increase in s, the borrowers have
to invest more of their own money in the projects and thus have a greater
incentive to ensure that they are not affected by their partner’s failure. Thus,
having an S type partner becomes even more important. While this is true
for both kinds of borrowers, given that S-types have a higher probability of
being empowered, it is even more so for S type borrowers.
We then consider Proposition 4(ii). In this case the alternatives involve
PAM-SS and NAM. Recall that under PAM-SS, the W-type borrowers re-
main single, so that their payoff, s, is independent of s. Thus the aggregate
payoff under PAM-SS is not that sensitive to an increase in s, hence the
result. If, however, the S-types are relatively much more empowered com-
pared to the S-types (formally λSλW > 2), then the aggregate payoff under
PAM-SS, i.e. vSS + vWW , still increases sufficiently fast compared to that
under NAM, i.e. 2vSW , so that I(s) is increasing in s.
Proposition 4 has some important policy implications. While, in the
23
present framework, “PAM” is going to take place even if s = 0, one can
conceive of situations where other factors, e.g. social and kinship ties, may
threaten to turn the balance in favor of NAM. In such cases, if λS < 2λW
and s is at an intermediate level, then an increase in s may lead to NAM.
This suggests that, from a policy perspective, the savings requirement, s,
needs to be used to with care.
5 Comparing Individual and Group-lending
In this section we argue that for a large range of parameter values group-
lending dominates individual lending as far as the payoff of the bank is
concerned. This provides a rationale for group-lending under such two stage
lending procedures. Interestingly, we also find that under certain conditions
individual lending may dominate group-lending.
For ease of exposition we first consider a hypothetical situation where the
extent of screening is the same under both institutional forms. Thus, under
both forms, either there is complete screening out of W-type borrowers, or
there is no screening out of W-types except to the extent that those who
cannot save in period 1 are screened out. In that case, Proposition 5 shows
that individual lending dominates JLL, in the sense that all agents, the
borrowers, as well as the bank, prefer the former.21
Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) vS(r) > vSS(r).
(ii) vW (r) > vWW (r).
(iii) B′(r) > B(r), and B′′(r) > B(r).
21It should be recognized though, that our framework abstracts from some of the positive
effects of group-lending recognized in the literature, namely peer monitoring (see, e.g.
Banerji et al., 1994) and social capital (see, e.g. Besley and Coate, 1995).
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While the proof of Proposition 5 is trivial,22 the intuition is interest-
ing and follows from what we term the contagion effect. Under JLL, the
borrowers are liable to pay for their partner’s default. Knowing this, an
E(2)-borrower who knows that her partner is going to shirk, has no in-
centive to work herself. Such contagion effects are absent under individual
lending, so that the incentive to work is greater in this case.23
Further, Proposition 5(iii) demonstrates that the bank also prefers indi-
vidual lending. Again the logic follows from the contagion effect. In case
both lending mechanisms have the same degree of screening, the only rea-
son the bank may prefer JLL is that there may be cross-subsidization in the
sense that a successful borrower may repay on behalf of an unsuccessful one.
The contagion effect, however, ensures that if one borrower shirks, then so
necessarily will the other one. Thus cross-subsidization cannot take place in
this framework.
Strikingly enough, despite Proposition 5, JLL may dominate individual
lending as far as feasibility is concerned. The argument turns on the fact
that while screening out bad borrowers is possible under both forms of lend-
ing, under JLL such screening takes place for a lower value of r. Thus, for
intermediate values of r, while such screening can take place under JLL, it
cannot under individual lending. This provides a rationale for JLL, even
though, the effort levels under JLL is lower compared to that under individ-
ual lending because of the contagion effect.
We need some more notations. Let
22The proof follows from a straightforward comparison of equations (2), (3), (5), (6),
(10), (11), (12), (14) and (15).
23While the contagion effect discussed above is reminiscent of the negative effect of JLL
identified by Besley and Coate (1995), unlike them we consider a scenario where project
returns are observable. The group aspect of JLL has some other negative aspects, e.g.
borrowers may collude against the bank. Further, the extreme punishments used under
JLL may create frictions between the borrowers and the loan officers (see, Aghion and
Morduch, 2005).
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rW (s) =
 r′W (s), if r′W (s), solving vW (s, r) = s, is well defined,0, otherwise,
where note that r′W (s) =
λW (X−e)−s
λW (1−s) is well defined if vW (s, r)|r=0 = λW (X−
e) > s.
Similarly, let
rWW (s) =
 r′WW (s), if r′WW (s), solving vWW (s, r) = s, is well defined,0, otherwise,
where note that r′WW (s) =
λ2W (X−e)−s
λ2W (1−s)
is well defined if vWW (s, r)|r=0 =
λ2W (X − e) > s.
The following observation is central to our analysis. Observations 3(i)
and (ii) follow from the fact that vW (s, r) and vWW (s, r) are both decreasing
in r. Observation 3(iii) follows from Proposition 5(ii) (see Figure 3).
Observation 3. (i) Consider individual lending. vW (s, r) ≥ s, i.e.,
for a W type borrower, taking a loan is individually rational, if and only if
r ≤ rW (s).
(ii) Consider group-lending. vWW (s, r) ≥ s, i.e., for a W type borrower,
taking a loan under PAM is individually rational, if and only if r ≤ rWW (s).
(iii) rW (s) > rWW (s), whenever rW (s) > 0.
Suppose rWW (s) ≤ r < rW (s). Then, from Observation 3(i), for any s ≤
s, W type borrowers cannot be screened out under individual lending. Thus
from A2(ii), individual lending is not feasible. Whereas under group-lending,
there is assortative matching (PAM-SS to be precise), and moreover, WW
type groups can be screened out for an appropriate choice of s (Observation
3(ii)). Thus the bank’s payoff in this case is B(sWW ) > 0.
Next suppose that r is relatively high, i.e. r > rWW (s). From Obser-
vation 3, W-type borrowers can be screened out under both both forms of
lending. Thus under individual lending the bank has a payoff of B′(sW ) =
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2(1−sW )(λSr−1), whereas under group-lending it has a payoff of B(sWW ) =
2(1− sWW )(λ2Sr − 1). While from A2(i) both are feasible, whether B′(sW )
is greater or less than B(sWW ), is ambiguous.
There are two effects at play here. While the contagion effect suggests
that B′(sW ) is likely to be greater, the fact that screening requires a higher
level of s under individual lending, i.e. sW > sWW ((4) and (13)), suggests
that B(sWW ) is likely to be greater. Suppose, for example, that λS is large.
Then the contagion is effect is negligible and B(sWW ) > B′(sW ). Whereas
if λW is small, then sW is close to sWW , so that B′(sW ) > B(sWW ).
Finally, suppose r < rWW (s). Then weak borrowers cannot be screened
out under either individual, or joint liability lending. From A2(ii), neither
is feasible.
Summarizing the above discussion we obtain Proposition 6, which is the
main result of this section.
Proposition 6. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) If rWW (s) ≤ r < rW (s), then group-lending is feasible while individ-
ual lending is not, i.e. B(sWW ) > 0 > B′′(s), ∀s ≤ s.
(ii) If rW (s) < r, then both group-lending and individual lending are
feasible. Whether the bank prefers individual or group-lending is, however,
ambiguous. Individual lending is preferred if λW is small, whereas group-
lending is preferred if λS is large.
The following example demonstrates that Proposition 6 is not vacuous.
Example. (i) Consider the case where X = 2, e = 0.5, s = 1/8,
r = 81/70, λS = 1 and λW = 1/2. It is clear that Assumptions 1 and 2 are
satisfied. Further, in this case rW (s) = 10/7 > r > 8/7 = rWW (s). Thus
the hypothesis of Proposition 6(i) is satisfied.
(ii) Consider the case where X = 2, e = 0.5, s = 1/8, r = 138/119,
λS = 1 and λW = 1/4. Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Further, in this
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case r > rW (s) = 8/7. Thus the hypothesis of Proposition 6(ii) is satisfied.
While the Grameen bank, and the innumerable Grameen replicators, all
adopt a group-lending methodology, there are many micro-finance organi-
zations who do not. In particular, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), the
largest micro-finance organization in the world, uses individual lending. It
is therefore important to identify conditions under which one or the other
lending mechanism may be preferable. Our results suggest that the choice
of institutional forms may be related to the rate of interest, with an interme-
diate interest rate favoring a group-lending scheme, whereas a higher level
may favor individual lending.
5.1 Optimal Choice of the Savings Pre-requisite
We then examine if the level of s chosen in Proposition 6 is the socially opti-
mal one. It is easy to see that the aggregate payoff of the bank and the two
recipient borrowers is independent of s. Consider Proposition 6(i). Under
group-lending the loan is made to an SS-type group so that the aggregate
payoff equals
2vSS(s) +B(s) = 2[λ2S(X − e)− 1 + s],
which is independent of s. A similar argument can be made in the other
cases also.24 The intuition is simple. Both the bank, as well as the borrowers
can transform one unit of capital into one unit of output. Thus it does not
matter whether a project is funded by the bank, or the borrowers. This
suggests that the level of s chosen in equilibrium is socially optimal.
24Consider Proposition 6(i). Under individual lending the loan is made to two borrowers
who are randomly picked out of those saving s. The expected aggregate payoff in this case
equals: 2[λSvS(s)
λS+λW
+ λW vW (s)
λS+λW
]+B′′(s) = 2[
λ2S+λ
2
W
λS+λW
(X− e)−1+ s], which is independent of
s. Next consider Proposition 6(ii). Under individual lending the loan is advanced to two
S-type borrowers, when the aggregate payoff equals 2vS(s)+B
′(s) = 2[λS(X− e)−1+ s],
which is independent of s.
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In the present context, however, it may be equally reasonable to assume
that the borrowers cannot necessarily transform one unit of savings into
one unit of output. Even if the borrowers are empowered, opportunities
for productive consumption and safe voluntary savings instruments may be
limited. Thus a borrower may be able to transform only a fraction 0 < µ < 1
of her period 1 savings into output. In that case it is easy to see that
the optimal s equals s.25 Since in this case the bank is more efficient in
transforming capital into output, it is optimal to use as little of the bank
money in the project as possible. Consequently, the equilibrium level of s
chosen by the bank is sub-optimal.
Remark. Let us briefly analyze the effect of introducing voluntary
savings instruments, as well as compulsory savings in such a scenario. Con-
sider voluntary savings first. The effect of such a scheme would be to in-
crease µ to µ′ > µ, so that borrower payoffs increase. Suppose that the
equilibrium involves group-lending with the WW-types being screened out.
Since vWW (s, µ′) > vWW (s, µ), the savings pre-requisite needed to screen-
out WW-types groups also increases, i.e. sWW (µ′) > sWW (µ). Thus the
equilibrium level of s also increases to sWW (µ′), so that it is closer to the so-
cially optimal level s. Thus, in addition to the direct effect which is captured
by an increase in µ, introduction of voluntary savings instruments leads to
an increase in the equilibrium level of s, which is socially optimal.
We then consider the effect of introducing a compulsory savings com-
ponent. Clearly, this does not affect the borrower’s payoff when she works,
but reduces it when she shirks. Thus, for the same level of s, the borrower
payoff is reduced. Suppose that the equilibrium involves group-lending with
the WW-types being screened out. Since vWW (s) decreases, the savings pre-
25Consider the case where under group-lending the loan is made to an SS-type group. In
this case, vSS(s) = λS [X−(1−r)s−e]+µ(s−s). Consequently, the aggregate payoff of the
bank and the two SHG members equals 2vSS(s)+B(s) = 2[λ
2
S(X−e)−1+µs+s(1−µ)],
which is increasing in s. A similar argument holds for the other cases.
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requisite needed to screen-out WW-types groups, i.e. sWW also decreases,
so that it is moves away from the socially optimal level s. Thus introducing
compulsory savings instruments yields a negative fallout in our framework
in that it leads to an decrease in the equilibrium level of s.
A full analysis of the effects of introducing compulsory and voluntary
savings is beyond the scope of the present paper though, and must await
future work.
5.2 Endogeneity of λi
Thus far the level of borrower empowerment is taken to be exogenous, in
particular we assume that getting a loan in period 1 does not affect the
empowerment level in the next period. It may be argued though, that
a borrower who obtains a loan will have a greater say in the household
allocation process in the second period.26 As pointed out by Basu (2006),
though, this process is likely to take some time. For analytical simplicity,
we considered an extreme form of this assumption where there is no change
in the level of empowerment within the time-frame considered.
It is clearly of interest to allow for such endogeneity though. It is often
argued, for example, that group-lending, because of interaction among the
borrowers, generates a high level of social capital. This, in turn, leads to
empowerment, so that empowerment levels are higher under group-lending
compared to that under individual lending. Let us formalize this by assum-
ing that under group-lending the empowerment level of a type i borrower
is λ′i in period two, whereas that under individual lending is still λi, where
26This is explicitly acknowledged in the literature on household decision making. Bour-
guignon and Chiappori (1994) and Moehling (1995), for example, assume that the level of
empowerment depends on the female wage rate. Basu (2006), on the other hand, argues
that this depends not just on the wage rate, but on what the women actually earn. There
is some ambiguity in the micro-finance literature on this point though, see Aghion and
Morduch (2005).
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λ′i > λi. As long as the contagion effect dominates the social capital effect,
in the sense that λ′2W < λW , then vWW < vW , so that rWW < rW . Hence
a version of Proposition 6(i) still goes through. If the social capital effect
is very strong though, in the sense that λ′2W > λW , then vWW > vW , so
that rWW > rW . Hence, for intermediate values of r, it may be possible
that weak types are screened out under individual lending, but not under
group-lending.
Next let us consider a scenario where, in period 2, the borrower is no
longer in control of household income. Our paper makes the not too unreal-
istic assumption that in this case the borrower has the option of not working
on her project. We can conceive of situations, however, where this is not an
option open to the borrower, and she has to obey the dominant male in the
household. In that case the effort level put in by the borrower is likely to
be higher (compared to the case where the borrower is in control), since the
dominant male may not internalize the effort cost of the borrower. Thus,
somewhat perversely, this may improve feasibility. Of course, in that case
the borrower may not be willing to take a loan in the first place.
Another issue relates to the effect of such endogeneity on the average
level of empowerment in the community. In case the strong borrowers get
even stronger, the bank would have a greater incentive to make repeat loans
to the same SHG. Further, it is easy to see that the incentive for “PAM”,
i.e. I(s), would also increase. It is possible that strong borrowers are also
borrowers with greater social capital, and it is this social capital that is
part of their strength. If that indeed is the case, then provision of loans to
strong borrowers may have the largest impact on the community, since the
recipients are also the potential leaders, being those with the largest social
capital. Otherwise, the impact may be limited, with the initial recipients
alone continuing to flourish.
Clearly a complete analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this
paper. Our purpose in discussing them, however briefly, is to suggest that
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our framework may be of use in understanding some of the rich complexities
associated with the group-lending process.
6 Discussion
In this section we discuss some robustness issues, as well as relate the analysis
to some relevant issues.
To begin with we discuss the roles played by Assumptions 1 and 2. The
first part of A1, that 2r(1−s) > X, implies that in case one borrower works
and the other one shirks, then the whole of X is taken away by the bank
under joint liability. While this simplifies the exposition, by making the
contagion effect more stark,27 the basic point, that joint liability reduces
the incentive to work, would still go through in its absence. The last part
of A1, that X − e > r, ensures that working is optimal under individual
lending (as well as under group-lending if the other member of the SHG also
works). Clearly in the absence of such an assumption the problem is not
interesting.
A2 ensures that lending, either individual or group, is feasible if and only
if the W-types can be screened out. A2 clearly simplifies the exposition, in
particular that of Proposition 6(i). Even in its absence, however, it can
be argued that for intermediate value of r, screening out weak borrowers is
possible under group-lending, but not under individual lending. Hence the
bank may still prefer joint liability lending to individual lending, so that the
central economic intuition behind Proposition 6(i) still goes through.
In the group-lending literature solving for the group size constitutes an
unresolved issue. While a full resolution of this question is beyond the scope
of the present paper, our analysis identifies some of the costs and benefits
associated with a larger group-size. On the negative side, a larger group-size
increases the contagion effect. On the positive side though, a larger group-
27In fact, the analysis goes through under the weaker assumption that X−2(1−s)r < e.
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size may, because of the same contagion effect, reduce the rate of interest
required to screen out weaker groups.
In the Indian SHG-linkage program, lending may also be contingent on
other aspects of borrower discipline, in particular repayment of internal
loans. While we abstract from this issue in this paper, our analysis is of
some relevance here. It may be argued that the repayment of internal loans,
like the savings pre-requisite, provides a signal about borrower discipline, i.e
the level of borrower empowerment, and helps to weed out weak borrowers.28
Finally, note that the Indian SHG-linkage program also has other fea-
tures in common with Grameen, e.g. sequential lending, dynamic incentives,
etc. Most of these, however, are reasonably well understood. Sequential
lending has been analyzed by Aniket (2007) and Roy Chowdhury (2005,
2007). Ghatak and Guinanne (1998) and Roy Chowdhury (2007) analyze
some aspects of dynamic incentives. This literature, however, is mostly in
the context of Grameen like schemes. It may be of interest to examine if the
intuitions gleaned from them go through in the context of the SHG-linkage
program.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of savings and borrower empowerment in
micro-finance. We consider a micro-finance scheme where the provision
of loans is conditional on prior savings. The savings scheme is different
from compulsory savings in that the savings are not locked in, and provides
a direct channel whereby savings can be transformed into assets. In a dy-
namic group-lending model with moral hazard, endogenous group-formation
and joint liability, we examine the effect of such schemes on the allocation of
loans between empowered and weak borrowers. We demonstrate that group-
28We refer the readers to Aniket (2006, 2007) for a different, though complementary,
justification of this requirement.
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formation leads to “positive assortative matching.” Our analysis suggests
that the savings requirement, s, performs two roles. First, it affects the in-
centive for SS-type group formation. As long as the borrower groups are not
too similar in terms of empowerment, an increase in s increases the incentive
for “PAM”. Otherwise, however, an increase in s may adversely affect the
incentive for “PAM”. Second, under some parameter configurations, s can
be used to screen out the weak types.
We then compare group-lending with individual lending. We find that
the analysis hinges on the contagion effect, that, because of joint liability,
incentive to work is greater under individual lending. For intermediate val-
ues of the rate of interest, group-lending allows for screening out of weak
borrowers and is thus feasible, while individual lending, which does not allow
for such screening out, is not. Whereas for relatively high rates of interest,
while weak types will be screened out under both institutional forms, be-
cause of the contagion effect, the bank may prefer individual lending over
group-lending.
Finally, our analysis allows us to draw some tentative policy conclusions:
1. In case the rate of interest is at an intermediate level, then group-
lending with joint liability is more likely to be feasible compared to individual
lending.
2. Whereas if the rate of interest is relatively large, and the weak types
are extremely dis-empowered, then individual lending is more likely to be
feasible compared to group-lending.
3. As a policy tool, the savings pre-requisite needs to be used with care
since an increase in the savings requisite may lead to negative assortative
matching.
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